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1 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
 The Louis Stein Center for Law and 
Ethics1 at Fordham University School of Law2
 
 
examines the critical role of lawyers in building a 
more just society, and explores how ethical values 
inform and improve the legal profession. The Stein 
Center supports a wide range of conferences, 
publications, and independent research. 
 Additional amici curiae are professors, 
practitioners, experts, and institutions in the field of 
legal ethics and criminal defense. Amici believe that 
competence is among the most foundational duties 
that lawyers owe to their clients, critical to 
safeguarding public trust in the legal profession and 
criminal justice system. As such, amici have an 
abiding interest in ensuring that courts honor the 
standards of lawyer competency required by both the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and the Sixth 
Amendment. As experts in the area of professional 
responsibility, amici hope to assist the Court in 
addressing the important issues presented by this 
case.  
 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.3 of the Rules of this Court, Petitioner 
and Respondent have consented to the filing of this brief. This 
brief was not written in whole or in part by counsel for any 
party, and no person or entity other than amici have made a 
monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of 
this brief. 
 
2 The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of 
Fordham University or the Fordham University School of Law. 
2 
 Because of the large number of amici, the 
names and brief descriptions of additional 
individuals and institutions are attached as an 
appendix. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Kentel Weaver demonstrated to the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts that his criminal 
trial was infected with structural error; however, the 
court denied him relief because it misguidedly 
applied harmless-error analysis. For three reasons, 
amici believe that when ineffective assistance of 
counsel results in structural error, defendants 
should not be required to prove prejudice.  
 
First, in failing to object to structural error, a 
lawyer commits a serious breach of his fiduciary and 
ethical duties. Allowing such incompetence to go 
unremedied causes individual defendants real harm 
and degrades trust in both the legal profession and 
the criminal justice system as a whole.  
 
Second, precedent urges a presumption of 
prejudice when ineffective assistance of counsel 
results in structural error. Like other lawyer errors 
for which this Court already presumes prejudice, 
structural errors contaminate the entire proceeding 
and manifest a serious breakdown of the adversarial 
process. Moreover, presuming prejudice is necessary 
when the probability of harm to the defendant is 
high, but the precise effects of the harm are difficult 
to measure. Finally, a presumption of prejudice is 
particularly appropriate because structural errors 
should be obvious to the court and can be easily 
prevented during trial.  
 
Third, presuming prejudice will not result in 
defense counsel purposefully failing to object to 
structural defects in the hopes of winning a new 
4 
trial. Intentionally failing to object to structural 
error violates the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
risks defense counsel’s professional and reputational 
interests. Furthermore, the trial court and 
prosecutors have both the ability and the duty to 
prevent structural error, putting a nearly 
insurmountable bar on defense counsel’s ability to 
commit intentional mistakes. Significantly, there is 
no empirical evidence supporting the concern that 
defense counsel will intentionally create or ignore 
structural errors.  
 
Therefore, amici respectfully urge this Court 
to presume prejudice in cases in which ineffective 
assistance of counsel results in structural error. 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is beyond dispute that Kentel Weaver was 
denied his constitutional right to a public trial. 
During jury selection, the courtroom was fully closed 
for two days, Pet. App. 39a, in clear violation of the 
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984); Presley v. Georgia, 
558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010).  
 
 The unconstitutional denial of the public trial 
right is classified as a “structural defect” because, 
unlike trial errors, “structural defect[s] affect[] the 
framework within which the trial proceeds.” Arizona 
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). In cases 
where defense counsel raises a timely objection, 
structural errors are subject to automatic reversal. 
Id. at 309-10. As this Court has observed, “structural 
defects . . . defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ 
standards,” because the precise effects of structural 
error are difficult to discern. Id. at 309. The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts accurately stated 
this rule when it explained that “[w]here a 
meritorious claim of structural error is timely raised, 
the court presumes ‘prejudice, and reversal is 
automatic.’” Pet. App. 39a (quoting Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 28 N.E.3d 437, 442 (Mass. 2015)).  
 
 But Mr. Weaver never received a new trial. 
Instead, Mr. Weaver’s defense counsel failed to 
object to the courtroom closure—a mistake that the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found to 
be “the product of serious incompetency, inefficiency, 
6 
or inattention to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial” and “not objectively 
reasonable.” Pet. App. 40a (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Nevertheless, the court demanded that Mr. 
Weaver demonstrate that his counsel’s mistake 
caused him prejudice, Pet. App. 40a, and denied his 
motion for a new trial because he could not do so, 
Pet. App. 40a-41a.   
 
 In placing such a burden on Mr. Weaver, 
Respondent has asked him to prove the impossible. 
Not only must he show that his counsel was 
incompetent (which he was), and that his counsel’s 
incompetency resulted in structural error (which it 
did), but Mr. Weaver must also show that this 
structural error—which this Court said in 
Fulminante “def[ies] analysis by ‘harmless-error’ 
standards”—was not, in fact, harmless. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. at 310. Defense counsel did not close the 
courtroom; the trial court did. But in practice, the 
rule advocated by Respondent means that the denial 
of Mr. Weaver’s constitutional right—in which the 
defense lawyer, the prosecutor, and the trial judge 
were equally complicit—cannot be remedied.  
 
 Mr. Weaver’s lawyer was incompetent, and 
Mr. Weaver suffered structural error. His injustice 
was twofold. But the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts refused to grant him relief because, 
in addition to suffering structural error, Mr. Weaver 
was also denied the effective assistance of counsel. 
Respondent’s rule would award less relief as the 
injury grows. To avoid this perverse result, amici 
urge this Court to grant Mr. Weaver the remedy he 
would have received but for defense counsel’s 
7 
incompetent and inexplicable failure to object: a new 
trial. 
 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT TOLERATE 
DEFENSE COUNSEL’S GRIEVOUS 
BREACH OF HIS FIDUCIARY AND 
ETHICAL DUTIES.  
 
A. Mr. Weaver’s Defense Counsel 
Breached His Duties of 
Competence and Diligence.  
 
 Lawyers owe their clients the fundamental 
fiduciary duties of competence and diligence. These 
obligations are foundational to the lawyer-client 
relationship, and they are enshrined in the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers, and the Rules of 
Professional Conduct of each of the fifty states. See 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 
2016) (“A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.”); Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 16 cmt. b (2000) (“A lawyer is a fiduciary . . . . 
Assurances of the lawyer’s competence, diligence, 
and loyalty are therefore vital.”); see also infra note 
4. These obligations extend to every client, 
regardless of a client’s identity, claim, or ability to 
pay. An indigent defendant deserves no less 
diligence or competence than the wealthiest 
corporate client. See ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function, Standard 
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4-1.1(a) (4th ed. 2015) (defining “defense counsel,” to 
whom the standards uniformly apply, as including 
lawyers “privately retained, assigned by the court, 
acting pro bono or serving indigent defendants in a 
legal aid or public defender’s office”). Lawyers who 
fail to provide competent representation to their 
clients breach both their common law fiduciary 
duties and their ethical obligations under the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.   
 
 To achieve the minimum competency required 
by their professional obligations, lawyers must 
possess and exercise “the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation.” Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 1.1. The fact that a lawyer has handled 
similar matters in the past does not automatically 
make his future representations competent. 
Furthermore, a generally competent lawyer may, 
due to a lapse of attention or understanding, perform 
incompetently in one particular phase or element of 
a case. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 
n.20 (1984) (“[T]he type of breakdown in the 
adversarial process that implicates the Sixth 
Amendment is not limited to counsel’s performance 
as a whole—specific errors and omissions may be the 
focus of a claim of ineffective assistance as well.”).  
 
 Unquestionably, Kentel Weaver did not 
receive diligent and competent representation as 
measured by “prevailing professional norms.” 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
During the empanelment of Mr. Weaver’s jury, court 
officials closed the courtroom, Pet. App. 38a-39a, in 
violation of Mr. Weaver’s clearly recognized Sixth 
9 
Amendment right to a public trial, Pet. App. 39a-
40a. But Mr. Weaver’s defense counsel raised no 
objection, Pet. App. 39a, because counsel incorrectly 
believed that the Constitution would tolerate the 
closure of a courtroom during voir dire, Pet. App. 
49a-50a. As the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts explained, Mr. Weaver’s lawyer 
simply “did not understand that the public had a 
right to be present during the jury empanelment 
phase of the trial proceedings.” Pet. App. 40a.  
 
 Such a lapse is inexcusable. One of defense 
counsel’s primary functions is to safeguard his 
client’s constitutional rights, requiring counsel to 
assiduously pursue avenues of procedural relief. As 
the ABA Standards for the Defense Function 
instruct, “Defense counsel should inform the client of 
his or her rights in the criminal process at the 
earliest opportunity, and timely plan and take 
necessary actions to vindicate such rights within the 
scope of the representation.” ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function, 
Standard 4-3.7(a). Because Mr. Weaver’s defense 
counsel so utterly failed in these duties, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts accurately observed 
that “counsel’s inaction was the product of ‘serious 
incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention to the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, 
and was not objectively reasonable.’” Pet. App. 40a.  
 
 Ignorance is no excuse. To maintain minimal 
competence, defense counsel must possess or acquire 
the knowledge necessary to mount an adequate 
defense, especially when constitutional rights are at 
issue. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: 
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Prosecution and Defense Function, Standard 4-3.7(g) 
(“Whenever defense counsel is confronted with 
specialized . . . legal issues with which counsel is 
unfamiliar, counsel should, in addition to 
researching and learning about the issue personally, 
consider engaging or consulting with an expert.”). 
Counsel’s unawareness of Mr. Weaver’s 
constitutional rights and counsel’s resultant failure 
to object to the closure of the courtroom fall far short 
of the competence “reasonably necessary for the 
representation.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.1; 
see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (holding that the 
defendant “must show that counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”). 
 
B. Allowing Gross Lawyer 
Incompetence To Go Unremedied 
Degrades Trust in the Legal 
Profession and the Criminal 
Justice System.   
 
 Because of his defense counsel’s ignorance, 
Kentel Weaver is now serving a life sentence for a 
conviction tainted by structural error. But while the 
interests of justice prescribe relief for Mr. Weaver, 
the importance of remedying ineffective assistance of 
counsel goes beyond safeguarding individual 
defendants’ rights. This case is about more than 
correcting one error; it is about preventing the 
degradation of the adversarial process. The courts’ 
role in enforcing lawyers’ duties of competence and 
diligence is essential to the health of the criminal 
justice system and the independence of the legal 
profession.  
11 
 A lawyer’s duties of competence and diligence 
are bedrock principles of the legal profession. Our 
legal system could not function—or, at least, 
function justly—any other way. An individual 
without legal training often cannot competently 
navigate the justice system alone; instead, he relies 
on a lawyer to make the justice system intelligible 
and accessible. See Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 16 cmt. b (“[A]dequate 
representation is often essential to secure persons 
their legal rights. Persons are often unable either to 
know or to secure their rights without a lawyer’s 
help.”). A client places absolute trust in his lawyer—
trust that the lawyer will safeguard the client’s most 
sensitive information, trust that the lawyer 
possesses the requisite legal knowledge and skill, 
and trust that the lawyer will zealously pursue his 
client’s interests.  
 
 It is vital that the legal profession earn and 
steward this trust. Individual clients often cannot 
monitor their lawyers’ performance, because “[a] 
lawyer’s work is sometimes complex and technical, 
often is performed in the client’s absence, and often 
cannot properly be evaluated simply by observing 
the results.” Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 16 cmt. b. Instead, the legal 
profession as a whole has made a promise to the 
public: In exchange for the privilege of self-
governance, lawyers and judges take responsibility 
for establishing, following, and enforcing rules of 
conduct that fulfill lawyers’ special fiduciary 
obligations. As the Preamble to the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct explains, “The legal 
profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special 
12 
responsibilities of self-government. . . . Neglect of 
these responsibilities compromises the independence 
of the profession and the public interest which it 
serves.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. cmt. 12. 
 
 In particular, public trust in the integrity of 
the criminal justice system relies on competent 
defense counsel. This is why the constitutional 
guarantee of “the assistance of counsel,” U.S. Const. 
amend. VI, requires more than the mere presence of 
“a person who happens to be a lawyer,” Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 685; see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been 
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.”). For the 
adversarial system to work, defense counsel must 
provide a reliable counterweight to the prosecution. 
As this Court stated in Cronic, “The right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is . . . the right of the 
accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive 
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. . . . 
[I]f the process loses its character as a confrontation 
between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is 
violated.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57. Only “access to 
counsel’s skill and knowledge” can guarantee 
defendants have “the ‘ample opportunity to meet the 
case of the prosecution’ to which they are entitled.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (quoting Adams v. U.S. 
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942)). 
 
 While in principle the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees effective assistance of counsel, it is the 
legal community that gives content to this right in 
practice. As this Court has recognized, “The Sixth 
Amendment refers simply to ‘counsel,’ not specifying 
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particular requirements of effective assistance. It 
relies instead on the legal profession’s maintenance 
of standards sufficient to justify the law’s 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the 
adversary process that the Amendment envisions.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  
 
 Strickland ’s presumption of competency is 
jeopardized when courts permit ineffective 
assistance of counsel to result in structural error. 
Defense counsel must make myriad strategic 
decisions during the course of their representations, 
and defendants unacquainted with criminal law and 
trial tactics must, in the usual case, trust their 
lawyers to make competent decisions. But the public 
loses confidence that defense counsel are not 
committing difficult-to-monitor trial errors when 
courts fail to redress easily detectible structural 
errors. The fiduciary promise of the legal profession 
falls under suspicion when self-regulation so openly 
and notoriously fails to safeguard defendants’ 
fundamental constitutional rights. Because it is 
imperative that no court tolerate grave lawyer 
incompetence that results in structural error, amici 
urge this Court to announce a rule that gives real 
effect to the fiduciary promise made by lawyers to 
their clients.    
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III. THE SAME LOGIC THAT PRECLUDES 
HARMLESS-ERROR ANALYSIS IN 
OTHER CONTEXTS COMPELS 
PRESUMING PREJUDICE WHEN 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL RESULTS IN STRUCTURAL 
ERROR. 
 
 In keeping with precedent and the judiciary’s 
central role in regulating the legal profession, this 
Court should presume prejudice when ineffective 
assistance of counsel results in structural error. The 
Court traditionally presumes prejudice for three 
reasons. First, counsel’s error contaminates the trial 
and manifests a “breakdown in the adversarial 
process.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. Second, the 
probability that the error resulted in harm to the 
defendant is high, but the precise effects of the harm 
are difficult to measure. See, e.g., id. at 658; 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Holloway v. Arkansas, 
435 U.S. 475, 488-91 (1978). Third, the trial judge 
can easily observe, prevent, and remedy the error. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. Taken together, 
these reasons reflect an understanding that public 
trust is essential to the proper functioning of our 
legal system and that judges have a substantial role 
to play in promoting that trust.  
 
A. The Error Infects the Trial and 
Manifests a “Breakdown in the 
Adversarial Process.” 
 
 This Court has frequently presumed prejudice 
in situations in which counsel’s error so 
contaminated the proceeding that it resulted in a 
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complete “breakdown in the adversarial process.” 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. Whenever a defendant is 
saddled with counsel who is “[un]able to invoke the 
procedural and substantive safeguards that 
distinguish our system of justice, a serious risk of 
injustice infects the trial itself.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980). To determine whether this 
risk has manifested, Strickland ordinarily imposes a 
prejudice requirement. The purpose of this 
requirement is to discern “whether counsel’s conduct 
so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on 
as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 686. However, in certain circumstances, 
defense counsel’s conduct so dramatically exhibits 
this risk of injustice and consequent breakdown of 
the adversarial process that any additional showing 
of prejudice should be unnecessary. This is the case 
when ineffective assistance of counsel results in 
structural error.  
 
Two situations in which the Court already 
presumes prejudice demonstrate this point. First, 
this Court presumes prejudice when “counsel 
entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to 
meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 
659. In Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), 
defense counsel failed to communicate to the 
defendant that by his agreeing to a prima facie trial, 
he was waiving his right to cross-examination. The 
Court concluded that the “denial of cross-
examination without waiver . . . [was] constitutional 
error of the first magnitude and no amount of 
showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Id. at 3 
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(emphasis added) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 
33). 
 
Second, this Court presumes prejudice when a 
concurrent conflict of interest “actually affect[s] the 
adequacy of [a defendant’s] representation.” See 
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349. Because conflicts of interest 
persist throughout the trial and impair counsel’s 
performance at every stage, the Court has not 
required defendants to show prejudice. Instead, the 
Court has assumed that such conflicts automatically 
undermine the trial’s fairness. See id. at 349 (“The 
conflict itself demonstrate[s] a denial of the right to 
have the effective assistance of counsel.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 
U.S. 364, 378 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that when defense counsel “labors under 
a conflict of interest that affects her performance, 
then [the Court] assume[s] a breakdown in the 
adversarial process that renders the resulting 
verdict unreliable”). 
 
Ineffective assistance of counsel that results 
in structural error demonstrates a similar 
contamination of the trial and consequent 
breakdown of the adversarial process. Structural 
errors are defects within the “framework” of the trial 
itself; when they are present, “a criminal trial cannot 
reliably serve its function as a vehicle for 
determination of guilt or innocence.” Fulminante, 
499 U.S. at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
577-78 (1986)). Like the denial of the right to cross-
examination, structural errors fundamentally 
undermine the adversarial process by depriving the 
defendant of essential structural protections. 
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Moreover, much like conflicts of interest, structural 
errors persist throughout the trial and “infect the 
entire trial process.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 630 (1993). This is especially true where the 
error involves the closure of the courtroom for voir 
dire. The knowledge that the jury was selected in an 
unconstitutional manner casts serious doubt upon 
defendant’s conviction.  
 
For these reasons, this Court has abandoned 
harmless-error analysis for structural defects. So 
long as defense counsel timely objects to the error, 
prejudice is presumed. Respondent, however, asks 
this Court to create a special rule for unpreserved 
structural errors, exempting them from the normal 
presumption. But to do so would be drawing a 
distinction without a difference. In both cases, the 
breakdown in the adversarial system is the same. 
The fact that trial counsel failed to object to the 
constitutional infirmity when it first occurred 
changes nothing.  
 
 To impose a heightened burden on individuals 
with ineffective counsel would be contrary to 
precedent. Just as importantly, such an imposition 
would undermine the notion that the legal profession 
and the courts together establish and enforce 
standards of conduct to maintain public trust. That 
trust is based on the belief that criminal status is 
determined through a fair and uniform process 
rather than procedural Russian Roulette; a client 
should not be denied essential structural protections 
merely because she happens to receive or retain a 
grossly incompetent lawyer.  
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 Lawyers and judges have a duty to “further 
the public’s understanding of and confidence in the 
rule of law and the justice system.” Model Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct pmbl. cmt. 6. By presuming prejudice 
in situations in which defense counsel’s error results 
in a breakdown of the adversarial process, the Court 
recognizes and affirms this responsibility. Because 
“legal institutions . . . depend on popular 
participation and support to maintain their 
authority,” id., it is imperative that the Court 
safeguard a trial’s fundamental structural 
protections. No structural protection is more 
important to the legitimacy of the judicial process 
than the right to a public trial. In an open trial, 
“[t]he public may see [that the defendant] is fairly 
dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and . . . may 
keep [the defendant’s] triers keenly alive to a sense 
of their responsibility and to the importance of their 
functions . . . .” Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (quoting 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 
(1979)). Defendants should not need to prove the 
harm caused by the loss of this right; it is inherent 
and obvious.  
 
B. Even Though the Precise Harms 
Are Difficult To Measure, the 
Probability of Prejudice Is High 
When the Error Continues To 
Infect the Proceeding. 
 
The Court has also long recognized the 
improvidence of requiring defendants to show 
prejudice in situations where harm is likely albeit 
difficult to prove. Strickland ’s prejudice 
requirement finds its roots in the principle that the 
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defendant should receive relief when “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694. However, in cases in which mistakes of counsel 
result in structural error, the probability of harm to 
the defendant is both extreme and incalculable. 
When the Court has encountered this problem in 
alternative settings, it has traditionally presumed 
prejudice for two reasons. 
 
First, certain errors “are so likely to prejudice 
the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a 
particular case is unjustified.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 
658 (collecting cases). For example, where a 
defendant has been denied counsel or the State has 
impermissibly interfered with the provision of 
counsel, the Court has consistently presumed 
prejudice on the grounds that the “likelihood that 
the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-
case inquiry is unnecessary.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 
U.S. 162, 166 (2002); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 
(“Prejudice [when counsel is denied or the state 
interferes with counsel’s assistance] is so likely that 
case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the 
cost.”).  
 
Second, presuming prejudice is appropriate 
when an error persists throughout the trial and the 
particular harms caused by the error are difficult to 
measure. Determining the amount of prejudice 
requires courts to establish a baseline in the 
counterfactual world of adequate assistance. But 
such analysis is impossible when the defect stems 
not from some discrete, identifiable error but rather 
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from the mechanism of the trial itself. The Court 
presumes prejudice in actual conflict of interest 
cases for this very reason, explaining that “it is 
difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense 
of representation corrupted by conflicting interests.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. Indeed, the attempt to 
calculate prejudice in such situations would 
necessarily require groundless speculation about 
unpredictable chains of events. For this reason, “a 
rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of 
interests . . . prejudiced him in some specific fashion 
would not be susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded 
application. . . . [T]o assess the impact . . . would be 
virtually impossible.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490-91; 
see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 
(1942) (“To determine the precise degree of prejudice 
. . . is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to 
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental 
and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice 
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising 
from its denial.”).  
 
When ineffective assistance of counsel results 
in structural error, the same concerns of probable 
prejudice and improbable proof are present. Harm to 
the defendant is highly likely, if not inevitable. 
Furthermore, such harm is difficult, if not 
impossible, to calculate. Structural errors call into 
question the entire “framework within which the 
trial proceeds.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. Indeed, 
as this Court has already recognized, once the 
Constitution’s “basic protections”—including the 
right to a public trial—have been violated, “no 
criminal punishment may be regarded as 
fundamentally fair.” Id. (quoting Rose, 478 U.S. at 
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577-78). Thus, once a structural error has occurred, 
the defendant is—by definition—prejudiced. 
 
There is a corresponding parallel between the 
difficulty of measuring the effects of conflicted 
counsel and structural error. Unlike ordinary trial 
errors whose “scope is readily identifiable,” 
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490, the harms of enduring 
structural error and conflicted counsel are not 
discrete. In the case of conflicted counsel, the error 
endures throughout the trial and the harms are 
based less on what counsel has done and more on 
what counsel has “refrain[ed] from doing.” Id. at 475 
(emphasis omitted). Thus, an investigation into 
prejudice necessarily involves counterfactual 
inquiries and “unguided speculation.” Id. at 491. 
 
Similarly, whereas the harm caused by a trial 
error may be “quantitatively assessed,” structural 
errors “defy analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards.” 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308-09. “Harmless-error 
analysis in such a context would be a speculative 
inquiry into what might have occurred in an 
alternate universe.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 
548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006). The closing of the 
courtroom, particularly during the critically 
sensitive process of voir dire, could have long-
reaching and unpredictable effects on the trial. In a 
public setting, different issues may have been raised; 
prospective jurors may have been asked different 
questions; perhaps even the resulting jury panel 
itself would have been different. If such possibilities 
sound speculative, it is because they are. But that is 
precisely the point. To evaluate the effects of 
counsel’s failure to object to the closure of the 
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courtroom during voir dire is to engage in “unguided 
speculation.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 491. If prejudice 
is not presumed in this situation, no defendant who 
raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
based on structural error will be able to succeed. 
This Catch-22 should have no place in ineffective 
assistance of counsel jurisprudence. 
 
Respondent would bar Mr. Weaver from relief 
precisely because his counsel’s error was so 
insidious. Under Respondent’s rule, counsel’s trial 
errors can be remedied upon a showing of prejudice. 
Counsel’s structural errors, on the other hand, are 
functionally permanent, since prejudice is so difficult 
to prove. Because this Court has held that structural 
errors generally require automatic reversal while 
trial errors do not, this paradoxical standard is 
inappropriate and unjust.  
 
In addition to breeding injustice at the 
individual level, Respondent’s standard would 
degrade the integrity of the legal profession and 
decrease public trust in the system as a whole. If 
defendants’ receipt of full structural protections were 
made to depend on their ability to retain effective 
counsel, the criminal justice system would appear 
arbitrary and poorly regulated. After all, criminal 
defendants are rarely in a position to know, let alone 
protect, their own rights; they must rely on their 
lawyers’ knowledge and expertise in this area. In 
order for the legal system to function in a manner 
worthy of public confidence, important structural 
protections, such as the right to a public trial, cannot 
be made to depend on a lawyer’s skill or diligence. 
The system loses its legitimacy if such protections 
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rest on the luck of the draw with respect to counsel’s 
competence. As the regulators of our own profession, 
lawyers and judges have the obligation to maintain 
professional standards that encourage confidence in 
the system.  
 
C. The Trial Court Can Easily Police 
the Error. 
 
In the usual case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the trial judge has few realistic 
opportunities to avert defense counsel’s mistakes. 
The judge may be unaware of counsel’s lapse, for 
example, when the question is whether counsel 
conducted an adequate investigation. Alternatively, 
the judge may perceive a potential lapse, but be 
unable to inquire into whether that “lapse” was 
strategic because such an investigation would invade 
the lawyer-client relationship. Structural errors, 
however, are different. The primary duty for 
preventing structural errors rests with the court. 
Moreover, structural errors are easy to observe and 
police. In circumstances such as these, where the 
trial court has both the ability and the responsibility 
to prevent error, this Court has traditionally 
presumed prejudice.   
 
For example, this Court has presumed 
prejudice where the right of counsel was denied or 
interfered with on the grounds that “such 
circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth 
Amendment right that are easy to identify and . . . 
easy for the government to prevent.” Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 692. The Court has reasoned similarly in 
concurrent conflicts of interest cases: “Given the 
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obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and 
the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in 
certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, it is 
reasonable for the criminal justice system to 
maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed 
prejudice . . . .” Id. at 692 (internal citation omitted).  
 
 As with the denial of counsel and concurrent 
conflicts of interest, structural errors cannot occur 
without the awareness and acquiescence of several 
parties. Judges are well-equipped and 
constitutionally obligated to guard against structural 
errors. All structural errors are observable and 
involve at least the tacit participation of the judge.3
 
 
Moreover, because structural errors are defects in 
the framework of the trial itself, the prosecutor 
should also be expected to recognize and address 
these errors.  
 Mr. Weaver’s case presents one of the rare 
circumstances in which the principal responsibility 
for preventing error lies not with defense counsel, 
but with the trial court. A public official, acting 
under the judge’s supervision, closed the courtroom 
                                                 
3 The complete list of structural errors recognized in 
Fulminante includes the “deprivation of the right to counsel . . . 
the right to self-representation at trial . . . and the right to 
public trial;” the “unlawful exclusion of members of the 
defendant’s race from a grand jury;” and trial by a “judge who 
is not impartial.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10. Since 
Fulminante, the Court has added two additional structural 
errors to the list: denial of the “right to counsel of choice,” 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146, and denial of the “right to a 
jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). None of these errors can 
occur without the court’s knowledge and assent. 
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during voir dire. While a competent lawyer could 
have—and would have—objected to this closure, Mr. 
Weaver should not be penalized for his counsel’s 
shortcomings. Where the judge, the prosecutor, and 
the defense counsel all failed to recognize and 
prevent clear structural error, there has been a 
grievous failure of the legal system’s self-regulation. 
“No amount of showing of want of prejudice would 
cure” this triple failure. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 3 
(quoting Brief for Respondent at 33). The fact that 
the judicial system failed to protect Mr. Weaver in 
the first instance cannot justify his continued 
suffering on appeal. In keeping with this Court’s 
precedent and the judiciary’s historic role in 
promoting a legal system that engenders public 
trust, amici urge this Court to presume prejudice in 
Mr. Weaver’s case. 
 
IV. APPLYING A PRESUMPTION OF 
PREJUDICE WILL NOT CAUSE 
DEFENSE COUNSEL TO MAKE 
INTENTIONAL MISTAKES. 
 
 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
expressed concern that if unpreserved structural 
error could be used as a means to win a new trial, 
counsel would “harbor error as an appellate 
parachute.” Commonwealth v. LaChance, 17 N.E.3d 
1101, 1107 (Mass. 2014) (quoting People v. Vaughn, 
821 N.W.2d 288, 308 (Mich. 2012)). This fear is 
unfounded. Presuming prejudice will not encourage 
defense counsel to intentionally create structural 
errors. First, creating an “appellate parachute” 
would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Second, the trial court can easily prevent structural 
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error, meaning that lawyers cannot intentionally 
provide ineffective assistance without the court’s 
acquiescence. Finally, there is no evidence 
demonstrating the widespread use of this “appellate 
parachute.”  
 
A. Purposeful Failure To Object to 
Structural Error Violates the Rules 
of Professional Conduct and 
Directly Conflicts with Defense 
Counsel’s Interests. 
 
 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
create several duties that counsel would violate by 
intentionally allowing their clients to suffer 
structural error. Rules in every state and federal 
district court would prohibit such intentional 
ineffective assistance of counsel.4
 
  
                                                 
4 A version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct has been 
adopted by forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. See 
Am. Bar Ass’n, State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profess
ional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html. 
Although not based on the Model Rules, the California Rules of 
Professional Conduct specially prohibit intentional 
incompetence. See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3-110 (2015) 
(“A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly 
fail to perform legal services with competence. . . . For purposes 
of this rule, ‘competence’ in any legal service shall mean to 
apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, 
emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the 
performance of such service.”). Through the adoption of local 
rules, federal district courts generally apply the Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the state where they sit. 
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 First, purposefully allowing structural defects 
would violate defense counsel’s obligations of 
competence and diligence. See Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 1.3. In order to act with the required “zeal 
in advocacy upon the client’s behalf,” lawyers must 
object to any structural error at trial. Model Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act 
with commitment and dedication to the interests of 
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s 
behalf.”). As Judge Duffly’s dissent in LaChance 
observed, “I do not accept the court’s assumption 
that a defendant’s trial counsel, who was aware of 
the removal of the defendant’s family members from 
the court room, would engage in conduct that fails to 
respect the duty of zealous representation owed to a 
client.” LaChance, 17 N.E.3d at 1112 (Duffly, J., 
dissenting).   
 
It is no response to argue that counsel 
complies with the mandate of zealous advocacy when 
he surreptitiously creates “appellate parachutes” for 
his clients. Such a tactic would still violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct. If counsel fails to object to 
structural error for tactical reasons without 
consulting with his client, counsel would be usurping 
a decision that rightfully belongs to his client. 
According to Model Rule 1.2, lawyers must respect 
their clients’ “decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation” and must “consult with the client as 
to the means by which they are to be pursued.” 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.2. Furthermore, to 
enable clients to make important decisions about 
their representation, lawyers have an affirmative 
obligation to clearly and consistently communicate 
with their clients. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 
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1.4 (“A lawyer shall . . . reasonably consult with the 
client about the means by which the client’s 
objectives are to be accomplished . . . [and] explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit 
the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.”). Certainly, the waiver of the 
constitutional right to a public trial—the deprivation 
of which constitutes reversible structural error—
would require communication with and approval by 
the client. By contrast, if the defendant knowingly 
and voluntarily waives the constitutional right at 
issue, he cannot later seek a new trial based on 
either a claim of structural error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
 
 Second, such conduct would violate a lawyer’s 
duties to the court. Withholding an objection to 
create an “appellate parachute” would “abuse legal 
procedure[s],” a tactic prohibited by the Model Rules. 
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.1 cmt. 1 (“The 
advocate has . . . a duty not to abuse legal procedure. 
The law, both procedural and substantive, 
establishes the limits within which an advocate may 
proceed.”). In particular, Model Rule 3.3 requires 
“Candor Toward the Tribunal.” Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 3.3. “This Rule sets forth the special 
duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid 
conduct that undermines the integrity of the 
adjudicative process.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
r. 3.3 cmt. 2. Purposefully harboring structural error 
would violate this rule. Similarly, Model Rule 8.4 
declares that “it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice.” Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 8.4; see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
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pmbl. cmt. 5 (“A lawyer should use the law’s 
procedures only for legitimate purposes . . . .”).  
 
 A lawyer who willfully permits structural 
error to permeate a trial would subject himself to 
discipline, which could include formal reprimand, 
prohibition against taking on future criminal 
representations, or disbarment. See Model Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct r. 8.4 cmt. 1. Lawyers in federal court 
can also be financially penalized for purposefully 
creating unnecessary appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
(2012) (“Any attorney . . . [who] so multiplies the 
proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy 
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ 
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”). 
Courts have broad powers to impose discipline on 
lawyers appearing before them. See In re Snyder, 
472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (“Courts have long 
recognized an inherent authority to suspend or 
disbar lawyers. . . . This inherent power derives from 
the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which 
granted admission.” (internal citations omitted)). 
Additionally, judges who witness or learn about 
serious breaches of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct must refer the offending lawyers to the 
appropriate disciplinary body. See Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct r. 2.15 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2010).  
 
 In addition to risking formal sanctions, 
lawyers who provide constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel face high reputational costs. As 
this Court has recognized, “[I]t is virtually 
inconceivable that an attorney would deliberately 
invite the judgment that his performance was 
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constitutionally deficient in order to win federal 
collateral review for his client.” Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986).  
 
 In fact, far greater than the theoretical risk 
that lawyers will intentionally tarnish their 
reputations for the sake of their clients is the 
observed risk that lawyers will turn against their 
clients in an attempt to save their reputations. 
Defense lawyers often vigorously fight against their 
former clients’ ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. For example, in Purkey v. United States, “[i]n 
response to [ineffective assistance of counsel] 
allegations,” defense counsel “filed a 117 page 
affidavit, in which he [went] into extensive detail to 
refute movant’s claims.” Purkey v. United States, No. 
01-00308-01-CR-W-FJG, 2009 WL 3160774, at *2 
(W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2009), aff’d, 729 F.3d 860 (8th 
Cir. 2013). Similarly, in Binney v. State, the former 
defense counsel gave the Attorney General’s Office 
“petitioner’s entire trial file” because he deemed the 
information “necessary for the defense of his 
representation.” Binney v. State, 683 S.E.2d 478, 481 
(S.C. 2009). Notably, the lengths to which some 
lawyers have gone to defend against ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims recently prompted the 
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics to issue a formal 
opinion on the subject. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010) 
(addressing the question of “whether a criminal 
defense lawyer whose former client claims that the 
lawyer provided constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel may . . . disclose confidential 
information to government lawyers . . . to help the 
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prosecution establish that the lawyer’s 
representation was competent”).  
 
Thus, the purposeful creation of structural 
error runs directly contrary to the self-interest of 
defense lawyers. Because of the strong professional 
disincentives facing defense counsel, forcing 
defendants to demonstrate prejudice on appeal adds 
a procedural bar solely to combat a non-existent 
problem. 
 
B. Because Judges and Prosecutors 
Have the Ability and Responsibility 
To Prevent Structural Defects, 
Defense Counsel Cannot 
Unilaterally Create Such Errors. 
 
 Structural errors can occur only through the 
court’s tacit participation. Unlike trial errors—
whose unconstitutionality may only be apparent 
with knowledge of facts outside the courtroom—
structural errors occur in the presence of the court. 
Crucially, this means that defense counsel cannot 
indiscriminately create “appellate parachutes” 
through structural error; the court has the ultimate 
power to prevent such defects from undermining the 
integrity of the trial mechanism.  
 
 In fact, it is the judge’s affirmative duty to 
prevent such structural errors. Judges have a 
responsibility to prevent the deprivation of rights 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice: Special Functions of 
the Trial Judge, Standard 6-1.1(a) (3d ed. 2000) 
(“The trial judge has the responsibility for 
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safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the 
interests of the public in the administration of 
criminal justice.”). Judges also must ensure that all 
officers of the court endeavor to preserve the 
defendant’s rights. The Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct mandates that “[a] judge shall require court 
staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s 
direction and control to act in a manner consistent 
with the judge’s obligations under this Code.” Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.15. 
 
This duty extends to prosecutors as well. The 
Rules of Professional Conduct make it clear that 
prosecutors also have an obligation to prevent 
structural errors from occurring. “A prosecutor has 
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not 
simply that of an advocate.” Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 3.8 cmt. 1. As a minister of justice, the 
prosecutor owes the defendant—and the criminal 
justice system writ large—the “obligation[] to see 
that the defendant is accorded procedural justice.” 
Id.  
 
Thus, an “appellate parachute” cannot result 
from defense counsel’s malfeasance unless the judge 
and prosecutor are also derelict in their professional 
duties.5
                                                 
5 Recent cases where this Court has addressed intentional 
defense counsel mistakes do not involve structural error, so 
they are distinguishable from the case at bar. See, e.g., Puckett 
v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133 (2009) (distinguishing 
failure to object to the violation of a plea agreement from cases 
involving structural error).  
 Because intentional structural errors only 
result from the simultaneous wrongdoing of defense 
counsel, judges, and prosecutors, they should not be 
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a serious concern. Trial courts, in effect, set the 
outer limit on the number of structural errors that 
defense counsel can make.  
 
C. There Is No Evidence To Support 
the Conjecture that Lawyers Would 
Intentionally Harbor Error.  
 
 Defense counsels’ use of “appellate 
parachutes” has not, and will never, run rampant. 
Under longstanding precedent, courts must inquire 
whether a lawyer’s purported mistake instead 
resulted from a strategic decision. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689 (explaining that judges must give 
counsel “wide latitude . . . in making tactical 
decisions”). If a court determines that a lawyer 
intentionally failed to object to structural error, the 
defendant cannot make an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. Furthermore, the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct would require a lawyer to be 
honest if questioned about whether his ineffective 
assistance of counsel was tactical. Model Rules  
of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.3 (“A lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact . . . to a 
tribunal.”). Having to admit that his deficient 
representation was tactical would prevent any gain 
from using such a strategy in the first place. 
 
 Accordingly, the potential benefit of a tactical 
mistake to the defendant is nil, while the potential 
cost to the defendant’s lawyer is extremely high. 
Thus, as Justice Brennan observed, the fear of 
intentional error “is without basis” because “no 
rational lawyer would risk the ‘sandbagging’ feared 
by the Court.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 
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102-03 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, 
Justice Brennan noted that “the Court points to no 
cases or commentary arising during the past 15 
years” that support such a concern. Id. at 102. Amici 
are aware of no empirical studies controverting 
Justice Brennan’s claim that have emerged in the 
intervening decades. In fact, four circuit courts and 
two state courts6
 
 have adopted a presumption of 
prejudice when ineffective assistance results in 
structural error with no apparent deleterious effects.  
 The “appellate parachute” is not a common 
occurrence, but in the few cases where it is unclear 
whether such a tactic has been used, granting 
defendants a new trial is far better than the 
alternative. However this Court decides to treat 
structural defects resulting from ineffective 
assistance of counsel, some “error” is inevitable. 
Either courts will grant a new trial based on the 
occasional intentional mistake, or courts will deny 
relief after unintentional mistakes. Equity clearly 
favors choosing the first option. Some party must 
bear the risk of structural error, but defendants 
should not bear all of it. Giving the benefit of the 
doubt to the defendant does not mean that a guilty 
man will go free; it simply means that the defendant 
will have the opportunity to vindicate his 
constitutional right to a fair trial. There are many 
checks preventing the widespread use of “appellate 
                                                 
6 See Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2009); Owens v. 
United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir. 2007); McGurk v. 
Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1998); Littlejohn v. United 
States, 73 A.3d 1034 (D.C. 2013); Montana v. Lamere, 112 P.3d 
1005 (Mont. 2005). 
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parachutes,” and the responsibility of the courts to 
protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights 
outweighs the risk that this practice may be used in 
a small minority of cases. 
 
36 
CONCLUSION 
 
The crucial importance of safeguarding the 
public’s trust in the justice system requires the legal 
profession to take seriously its professional duties to 
render effective assistance of counsel. This duty 
could not be more important than when a 
defendant’s liberty is at stake. For the foregoing 
reasons, amici respectfully urge that the decision of 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts be 
reversed.  
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IDENTIY OF AMICI CURIAE1
 
 
Institutional Amici 
 
 The Monroe H. Freedman Institute for 
the Study of Legal Ethics at Hofstra University’s 
Maurice A. Deane School of Law serves as a research 
center for the study of legal ethics. The Freedman 
Institute sponsors programs and conferences for 
scholarly inquiry and trains law students to take 
responsibility for serving others. The Freedman 
Institute seeks to focus the attention of law students, 
scholars, judges, and practitioners on today’s most 
significant issues for the legal profession.  
 
The National Association for Public 
Defense (NAPD) is an association of more than 
14,000 professionals who deliver the right to counsel 
throughout all U.S. states and territories, including 
all staff providing legal representation through the 
Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel 
Services (CPCS) as well as assigned counsel in the 
Commonwealth. NAPD members include attorneys, 
investigators, social workers, administrators, and 
other support staff who are responsible for executing 
the constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel. NAPD’s members are advocates in jails, in 
courtrooms, and in communities and are experts in 
theoretical best practices as well as in the practical, 
day-to-day delivery of services. Their collective 
expertise represents state, county, and local systems 
through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel 
                                                 
1 The affiliations of the various amici are for identification 
purposes only, and the views expressed in this brief do not 
necessarily reflect the views of any associated institutions. 
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delivery mechanisms, dedicated juvenile, capital and 
appellate offices, and through a diversity of 
traditional and holistic practice models. NAPD 
provides webinar-based and other training to its 
members on the importance of providing vigorous 
defense advocacy in all phases of litigation, including 
preservation of trial error to secure the most optimal 
standard of review during any appellate or post-
conviction phase of a case.  
 
Individual Amici  
 
Aviva Abramovsky is the Kauffman 
Professor of Entrepreneurship and Innovation and 
Associate Dean for International Initiatives at 
Syracuse University College of Law. Professor 
Abramovsky teaches courses in insurance law, 
commercial transactions, and professional 
responsibility. She has twice served on the American 
Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary. She currently serves on the Editorial 
Board of the National Ministry of Public 
Prosecutorial Ethics Council Journal of Brazil. 
 
Joshua P. Davis is the Director of the Center 
for Law and Ethics, Associate Dean for Academic 
Affairs, and a Professor of Law at the University of 
San Francisco School of Law. He teaches in the areas 
of legal ethics, antitrust, complex litigation, and 
constitutional law. He previously served as the 
reporter for the committee that drafted the 
California Supreme Court rules on multi-
jurisdictional practice and testified before the United 
States Congress on federal pleading standards. 
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Tigran W. Eldred is a Professor of Law at 
the New England School of Law. His research 
explores the regulation and psychology of 
decisionmaking of lawyers in various contexts, 
including criminal law and legal ethics. He teaches 
and writes in the areas of constitutional and ethical 
legal practice. 
 
 Lawrence J. Fox is a partner at Schoeman 
Updike & Kaufman LLP. He is also currently the 
George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting 
Lecturer of Law at Yale Law School, teaching ethics 
and professional responsibility, and serves as the 
supervising lawyer for the Ethics Bureau at Yale, 
one of the law school’s student clinics. He was 
formerly a lecturer in law at both Harvard Law 
School and the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, and has authored many articles and books on 
professional responsibility. He is the former Chair of 
the American Bar Association Standing Committee 
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and has 
served as an advisor for the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers. 
 
 Bennett L. Gershman is one of the original 
faculty members at Pace Law School and has taught 
as a visiting professor at Cornell Law School and 
Syracuse Law School. While in private practice, he 
specialized in criminal defense litigation. A former 
prosecutor with the Manhattan District Attorney’s 
office for six years, he is the author of numerous 
articles as well as two books on prosecutorial and 
judicial ethics. He served for four years with the 
Special State Prosecutor investigating corruption in 
the judicial system.  
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Bruce A. Green is the Louis Stein Chair at 
Fordham Law School, where he directs the Louis 
Stein Center for Law and Ethics. Currently, 
Professor Green is a Council member and past chair 
of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, serves on the 
Multistate Professional Bar Examination drafting 
committee, and is a member and past chair of the 
New York State Bar Association’s Committee on 
Professional Ethics. He previously served on the 
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, was the Reporter to both 
the ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege 
and the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional 
Practice, and co-chaired the ethics committees of the 
ABA Litigation Section and Criminal Justice 
Section. Previously, Professor Green was a federal 
prosecutor in the Southern District of New York, 
where he served as Chief Appellate Attorney. 
 
Jennifer M. Kinsley is a Professor of Law 
and Director of Experiential Learning at Northern 
Kentucky University’s Salmon P. Chase College of 
Law, where she directs the school’s clinical and 
externship programs and teaches Trial Advocacy, 
Legal Analysis and Problem Solving, and Client-
Centered Practice. A former public defender and civil 
rights attorney, she is a past president and member 
of the Board of Directors of the First Amendment 
Lawyers Association and presently serves as co-chair 
of the National Association for Public Defense 
Amicus Committee.  
 
Susan R. Martyn is the Distinguished 
University Professor and John W. Stoepler Professor 
of Law and Values at the University of Toledo 
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College of Law. She is the co-author of Red Flags: A 
Lawyer’s Handbook on Legal Ethics (2d ed. 2010), 
The Ethics of Representing Organizations: Legal 
Fictions for Clients (2009), and Traversing the 
Ethical Minefield: Problems, Law, and Professional 
Responsibility (2d ed. 2008). She has served as a 
member of the American Bar Association Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, as an advisor for the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, and as a 
member of the Ohio Supreme Court Task Force on 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
Janet Moore is an Associate Professor of 
Law at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
Professor Moore teaches in the areas of criminal law, 
criminal procedure, evidence, and civil rights 
litigation. Professor Moore co-convened the Indigent 
Defense Research Association, a national 
organization of practitioners, researchers, and policy 
makers who use data to improve public defense, and 
she has served as an invited expert for the American 
Bar Association’s Indigent Defense Advisory Group, 
the Indigent Defense Commissions of Michigan and 
Texas, and the Steering and Amicus Committees of 
the National Association for Public Defense. 
 
Russell G. Pearce is the Edward & Marilyn 
Bellet Chair in Legal Ethics, Morality, and Religion 
and Professor of Law at Fordham University. He 
teaches in the areas of professional responsibility, 
legal ethics, and religious liberty. In addition to 
penning numerous articles on legal ethics, Professor 
Pearce is a co-author of Professional Responsibility: 
A Contemporary Approach (2d ed. 2013). He has also 
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received the Sanford D. Levy Memorial Award from 
the New York State Bar Association “in recognition 
of his contribution to understanding and 
advancement in the field of professional ethics.” 
 
Nancy B. Rapoport is the Garman Turner 
Gordon Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd 
School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
(UNLV). She also serves as Special Counsel to the 
President of UNLV and as an Affiliate Professor of 
Business Law and Ethics in the Lee Business School 
at UNLV. She teaches courses in professional ethics, 
corporate governance, and business ethics.  
 
Abbe Smith is Director of the Criminal 
Defense and Prisoner Advocacy Clinic, Co-Director of 
the E. Barrett Prettyman Fellowship Program, and 
Professor of Law at Georgetown University. 
Professor Smith teaches and writes on criminal 
defense, legal ethics, juvenile justice, and clinical 
legal education. In addition to writing numerous law 
journal articles, she co-authored Understanding 
Lawyers’ Ethics (4th ed. 2010). 
 
Ellen C. Yaroshefsky is the Howard 
Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics 
and Executive Director of the Monroe H. Freedman 
Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics at Hofstra 
University’s Maurice A. Deane School of Law. She 
teaches a range of ethics courses, organizes 
symposia, and writes and lectures in the field of 
legal ethics. Professor Yaroshefsky served as a 
Commissioner on the New York State Joint 
Commission on Public Ethics and was the co-chair of 
the American Bar Association’s Ethics, Gideon & 
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Professionalism Committee of the Criminal Justice 
Section. She also serves on the New York State 
Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct, on 
ethics committees of state and local bar associations, 
and as the co-chair of the Ethics Committee of the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
